The assumption that nominal price adjustment is costly for firms (there are "menu costs") has generated a stream of important theoretical papers over the last decade or so.
product. These simplifications enable us to abstract from matters -suc h as determining the identity of active firms -extraneous to our main concern of establishing a clean connection between market structure and the pattern of price (in)flexibility. 4 To set a benchmark and to obtain a simple solution by backward induction, we begin by assuming a two-period time-horizon. Then we extend the analysis to the case where the incumbent faces an ever-recurring threat of entry, that is, with an infinite horizon.
5 This is the scenario we call "quasi-competitive". Comparing these two extreme cases yields an intuitively appealing relationship between competitiveness and the pattern of nominal price adjustment.
Whereas the two-period model produces some inflexibility in either direction, the increased competitiveness generated by the infinite horizon reverses the Keynesian asymmetry.
Furthermore, the two-period case may be of independent interest, for it highlights a somewhat paradoxical result concerning the interpretation of price observations. We show that the observation of a small r eduction in nominal price need not be taken as evidence that nominal price is flexible downward with respect to a reduction in a nominal scale variable.
Section I sets out the model, while Section II examines the solution. Section III places the model in t he context of some related literature, and Section IV concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
I. The Model
Time is modeled in discrete periods, indexed by the subscript t = 1, 2, ... 6 Let N be a nominal variable (e.g., a cost-of-living index) subject to random shocks. Denote its realized value for period t by N t , which is publicly observed at the start of the period. Realizations are independent draws from a probability distribution . Firms engage in Bertrand competition, but for any period t only one of the k
firms bidding the lowest price is chosen randomly to supply the good. This simplification may represent a situation where there exists some (small) exogenous asymmetry that allows a lowest-price firm to incur the menu cost before the others. Alternatively, the assumption fits the scenario of a central purchasing agency, where demand originates from decentralized units of a larger organisation, such as divisions of an M -form corporation or schools and hospitals operating under a local government agency. In these circumstances, it is common for the agency to select one supplier and let individual units order from the chosen firm according to their requirements (Peter J.H. Baily, 1987) . Such contracts are generic, in that the chosen supplier provides the full menu only after agreeing terms with the agency. Throughout, we regard any firm that bids a new nominal price in period t + 1 (different from the nominal price ruling at t) as a potential entrant in period t + 1 -even if the firm concerned was the incumbent in period t. Also, if, for period t+1, the incumbent from period t offers to continue supplying at its period-t nominal price, we regard this as a bid like any other. Exit is assumed to be costless in the sense that if a firm becomes the incumbent (prints a new menu) in one period, it is under no obligation to supply the market in any subsequent period. 
where 2 N is defined by
Proof: see the appendix.
To see the intuition of this proposition, consider first period 2. As exit is costless, there are only two potential equilibrium nominal prices for the one-shot Bertrand game played in this period: (a) a new menu is printed and a new nominal price charged which, because of the force of Bertrand competition, must be the break-even nominal price: 
−
, so it prefers to exit. The entrant's equilibrium nominal price * 2 P will allow it to break even:
, where the inequality follows from (5), given that , where
, the equilibrium nominal price in period 2 lies on BC in Figure 1 .
, the incumbent is undercut by a breaking-even entrant setting * 1 2 * 2 P P P < = (segment AB applies). When we extend the analysis to a quasi-competitive industry with nominal prices set under an infinite horizon, we find that nominal prices are perfectly flexible downward. This result is formalised in the following proposition, where, for simplicity, we focus on the adjustment (if any) of nominal price in period 2:
B'
PROPOSITION 2 (reversal of the Keynesian asymmetry under an infinite horizon):
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is similar to that for Proposition 1, with two major differences. First, an entrant in period 2 is no longer required to set a nominal price that yields zero real net profit in that period. Indeed, the equilibrium nominal price for an entrant will have to be such that it yields a zero expected value of the stream of real net profits over the infinite horizon, irrespective of the period of entry.
17 Second, because of the infinite horizon, in the event of 2 N falling short of 1 N by however small an amount, the incumbent can no longer retain the nominal price from the previous period without being undercut. In fact, an entrant in period 2 would face exactly the same prospects the incumbent had faced in period 1, except that now the entrant enjoys a lower realization of N, and therefore can achieve a zero present value of the stream of real net profits by setting a nominal price lower than * 1 P . This is the source of the downward nominal price flexibility. In the event of a realization 2 N above 1 N , similar logic yields the conclusion that, because of the higher nominal menu cost, * 1 P cannot be undercut.
However, if , a further marginal change in either direction has no effect on nominal price, while if the value of N reaches the upper bound * t P , a further small rise in N will be accompanied by a nominal price rise. Hence, the model is consistent with a variety of observations of nominal price adjustment and inflexibility. The critical difference between the two-period and the infinite-horizon cases is that in the latter the lower bound of the range of realizations of 2 N for which nominal price is unchanged turns out to be 1 N (as opposed to 1 2 N N < in the two -period case), so that any negative shock immediately following an adjustment in nominal price will always result in a lower nominal price. Therefore, under an infinite horizon, we obtain the reverse of the Keynesian asymmetry. In terms of Figure 1 , the general shape of the adjustment curve survives, except that now it slopes downward not to the left of point B, but to the left of point B', as shown by the broken curve AB'.
III. Some related literature
The model can be linked to several strands of the literatur e on nominal price adjustment. The contribution most closely related to ours is that by Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1987) , who compare the nominal price adjustment, in the presence of menu costs, of a monopolist with that of duopolists. When a nominal scale variable is perturbed, they find some inflexibility, both upward and downward, in each market structure, but with greater inflexibility for the monopolist.
Thus, they relate the extent of nominal price adjustment to market structure. Our contribution extends their logic, by showing that not only the extent, but also the form, of adjustment may change with market structure.
Secondly, there is a literature focusing on the labor market that argues that workers resist nominal wage cuts and so, if mark-ups are not too countercyclical, nominal prices tend to be inflexible downward. The contribution by Christopher Hanes (1993) is particularly pertinent here. In his analysis firms recognize that a nominal wage cut may result in a costly strike. In the case of an imperfectly competitive industry, the cost associated with the latter may offset the benefits of setting a lower nominal wage. In contrast, a competitive industry cannot sustain nominal wage (and price) rigidity as a Nash equilibrium, as each firm w ould have an incentive to deviate. Hanes attributes the increase in nominal rigidity in the United States in the late 19 th century to the rise of imperfect competition. There is a broad parallel with our model, in so far as the costs associated with strike action may be regarded as the menu cost of setting a lower nominal wage. Given the existence of such costs in Hanes's analysis, downward nominal rigidity only obtains when markets are imperfectly competitive, a result similar to that implied by our model. Thirdly, there is the empirical evidence on the effects of monetary shocks. Using primarily US data, various studies (for example, James Cover, 1992) have found that negative monetary shocks have a greater effect on output than positive ones. Several theoretical explanations have been suggested for this finding (see Magda Kandil, 1996) , one being that it results from the Keynesian asymmetry. However, more recent work casts doubt on the robustness of Cover's results. Morten Ravn and Martin Sola (1996) find that, once the 1979 regime shift in monetary policy is allowed for, positive and negative shock have symmetric effects, a conclusion that is supported by Charles Weise (1999) . 18 In conjunction with the micro data referred to above, which identify various patterns of asymmetric adjustments with no one type being prevalent, these recent findings highlighting a lack of asymmetry at the aggregate level are consistent with our general hypothesis that the pattern of nominal price adjustment depends on the market structures of the industries concerned.
IV. Conclusion
Although our analysis is intended as a depiction of one of the many forms that market competition may take, rather than to have general validity, we believe that, when combined with existing menu-cost f ormulations, it makes rather forcibly the point that the pattern of nominal price (in)flexibility induced by the presence of menu costs depends crucially on the type of competition assumed in the relevant markets. The fact that the Keynesian asymmetry does not appear in the two-period case, but is reversed in the more fiercely competitive infinite-horizon case, reinforces our conclusion.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
We start from period 2. For any given Using (4),
, that is, no entrant could match (and a fortiori undercut) the incumbent's nominal price without incurring a real net loss. As
appropriate ε can be found such that
, so that the incumbent can maintain its period-1 price and still make a positive real net profit. To prove that * 1 1 P N < , suppose that * 1 1 P N ≥ , so that the incumbent not only would not be able to cover its menu cost but would make an additional real loss
. This additional loss can never be recouped in period 2, where the maximum net real profit can be equal at most to the real menu cost m.
(ii): Two conditions must be satisfied for nominal price not to be adjusted in period 2: (a) by retaining its period-1 nominal price, the incumbent makes a non-negative real gross profit, and (b) no entrant can undercut period-1 nominal price and make a non-negative net profit. Using (4), P is determined by the condition that the real net loss incurred in period 1 is offset by the discounted expected real net profit generated by nominal price rigidity in period 2, namely ,
is the discount factor.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
Suppose firm f becomes the supplier for period t. Let
denote the expected present value of f 's real net profit stream from period t onwards, net of real menu cost m , when it prints a menu with nominal price t P :
where L t and U t are respectively the greatest lower and least upper bounds of the range of realizations of N for which the incumbent of period t can retain the previous period's nominal price, earn non-negative profits and not be undercut. . This implies that the non-positive real gross profit accruing in period 1 must be offset by strictly positive expected real net profits earned from period 2 onwards, that is, there must exist a range of realizations
To prove that no such range exists it suffices to show that for any
> , so that undercutting by an entrant is both feasible and profitable. Using (A3) and (4) we obtain
It cannot be the case that (ii). * 1 P is the smallest solution of the equation
The l.h.s. of (A5) is the real net loss incurred at 1 t = , whereas the r.h.s. of (A5) Gupta. We are also grateful to V. Bhaskar, Huw Dixon, Elisabetta Iossa, Jonathan Thomas, and anonymous referees for very helpful comments.
5 To establish the basic message of the paper it is not necessary to examine the more complicated case of a T-period model, where
Where appropriate, we specify whether the model is of the two -period or of the infinite-horizon variety. 7 If J=1 in our model nominal price adjusts in a manner similar to that found by Robert J. Barro (1972) . 8 The assumption of constant marginal cost merely simplifies the exposition, as our results would still hold if marginal cost were increasing (see footnote 14). 9 As the product is assumed to be homogeneous, no benefits would flow from a long-term relationship and the agency always has the incentive to switch to a lower-price supplier. For example, in the UK, recurrent procurements of homogeneous goods for the National Health Service (amounting to about $1bn p.a.) are handled by the NHS Supply Agency on the basis of six-month contracts. 10 Conversely, we assume that a menu printed in period t kills all older menus, that is, once a menu printed at t has been superseded by another menu in period t + s, it cannot be costlessly resurrected in later periods. 11 The demand function is defined in terms of real prices only for simplicity. For more general demand functions of the form
we can identify simple conditions under which the main results apply (see footnote 14).
12 Our results also apply with the more general demand function D(P, N) if either (i) the elasticity of demand w.r.t. the nominal variable N weighted by the mark -up rate is less than unity (or, equivalently, menu costs are "small" compared to turnover); or (ii) the elasticity of demand w.r.t. changes in the nominal variable does not exceed the price elasticity of demand for output. real cost of production be and so no entrant could both break even and match * 1 P . 17 The condition specified in part (i) of the propositions -that in period 1 real net (gross) profits be negative (positive) -now applies not only to the first incumbent, but also to entrants in any 20 Notice that the probability that NS falls within this range is raised to the power s to take into
